Diplomatically, militarily and morally, Bosnia has been a no-win war. It’s certainly been nothing but a loser for Clinton. Last week’s events forced him into the fray–in a way that showcased his administration’s inconsistency on this issue. On Wednesday, speaking to the Air Force Academy, Clinton said America “should be prepared” to protect U.N. peacekeepers consolidating into more defensible positions, acknowledging that this might mean the “temporary use of our ground forces.” Before last week, the administration had vowed that U.S. ground forces would be used only to police a comprehensive peace settlement, or to assist a U.N. withdrawal. Bosnia is an unpopular cause; in the latest NEWSWEEK Poll, 55 percent of the Americans surveyed said Bosnia was not their problem, and they didn’t want to get involved. On Thursday, with Congress in full cry against him, Clinton tried to scramble back up the slippery slope. In public statements–and, NEWSWEEK has learned, in a mission to Paris–the administration retreated from the offer. Saturday, in his radio address, Clinton insisted “it is highly unlikely that we would be asked to do it.”
But it was difficult to stay out of the quagmire. A U.S. military search-and-rescue team was sent into Bosnia to hunt for the missing pilot (page 22). Sources said that more U.S. military action will be taken, eventually, to punish the Serbs for shooting down the plane. And Clinton has promised to help, with as many as 25,000 American combat troops, if the U.N. peacekeepers have to leave Bosnia under fire.
As they contemplate Bosnian options that range from bad to worse, the Western allies ought to keep an eye on the “Mogadishu line.” That’s what separates peacekeeping from peace-making, protecting the helpless from punishing the aggressors. In Somalia, a clearly defined mission to feed starving people and shield them from bandits turned into a quixotic campaign against Somali war-lords. The result was the death of 18 American soldiers on abloody Sunday in Mogadishu, soon followed by an ignominious withdrawal. Bosnia is a far more complex and dangerous situation. But there, too, the options boil down to one basic choice. French Prime Minister Alain Juppe has been repeating it for months, like a mantra: “Beef up or get out.”
So far, the NATO allies have chosen to beef up. The British have sent troops and artillery. U.S. and French warships are poised offshore. But the allies still hadn’t decided exactly what to do with the extra muscle. The options:
Get out now: With the U.N. operation widely reckoned an abject failure, NATO has drawn up a blueprint–Oplan 40104–for an emergency bug-out. Withdrawing the 20,000 lightly armed peacekeepers could be difficult. Bosnia’s Muslim government probably would contest a U.N. withdrawal. The Serbs might, too, particularly if they sense that the embargo on arms shipments to Bosnia will be lifted once the peacekeepers are out.
Reduce the U.N. presence: In a report last week, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed scaling back the “untenable” U.N. role. Peacekeepers would be withdrawn from “safe areas” they now protect, leaving only a few observers in the enclaves, “without any actual or implied commitment to use force to deter attacks against them,” he wrote, giving the U.N. force “a realistic mandate.” But it would transform the remaining peacekeepers–and the Muslim civilians they have been shielding–into sitting ducks for the Serbs.
Hit back at the Serbs: France and Britain planned to set up a heavily armed, centrally based “rapid reaction” force to deal with Serbian challenges. It was expected that the force, with about 10,000 troops, would be nominally under U.N. control, but operationally independent. The French and British weren’t clear about how they would actually use the troops. U.S. officials worried that they would inevitably stumble across the Mogadishu line, taking sides against the Serbs.
Build up and redeploy: The Europeans favor reinforcing while moving their troops to more defensible positions. That would make the U.N. troops safer, but even less effective at providing aid than they are now. And the move could be dangerous; the Serbs might try to stop the redeployment. Trying to assuage European worries, Clinton made his offer of help. (Reporters were told that assistance with reconfiguring meant U.S. troops on the ground; White House and State Department sources blame each other for firming up the “ground troops” option.) The day after Clinton’s air force speech, Pentagon Under Secretary Walter Slocombe flew secretly to Paris to meet with the French and British. There he reiterated the original two conditions of U.S. ground-troop deployment; help with reconfiguring was never mentioned, making it clear that Washington didn’t want to be asked. The White House stressed that the troop offer was just an idea–“a discrete, temporary, hypothetical action,” said Lake.
Cut a deal with Milosevic: A U.S. envoy held tense negotiations with the patron of the Bosnian Serbs, President Slobodan Milosevic of the neighboring Serbian Republic. The U.S. aim was to persuade Milosevic to recognize Bosnian statehood and cut off the flow of supplies to the Serbian separatists. In return, the economic sanctions that have punished Milosevic would be suspended. By the weekend, there was still no agreement on how many pieces of silver it would take to purchase his dubious loyalty.
The deal was almost completed last month, but Washington wanted the single handed authority to reimpose sanctions if the notoriously slippery Milosevic fails to keep his promises. And the Americans still wouldn’t allow the Serbian soccer team to play in international matches, a severe rebuff to the football-mad Serbs. When negotiations resumed last week, they appeared to be going badly. After Milosevic arranged for the release of some U.N. hostages, he expected a payoff but apparently didn’t get enough. “We need that agreement,” said a European diplomat at the United Nations. “Whatever package is acceptable to Milosevie, we buy it.”
Build up and then get out: NATO’s plan to reinforce and redeploy the U.N. peace-keepers may turn out to be only the first step in a complete withdrawal. Concentrated in safer positions and protected by a rapid-reaction force, the peacekeepers would have an easier time getting out of the country whenever their governments lose patience. Britain wants to keep working for the original Western objectives–containment of aggression, humanitarian relief and a political settlement–but if the Serbs remain hostile, the British will leave, sources say. Similarly, the new government of French President Jacques Chirac is quietly passing the word that it will allow the beefed-up operation to run for the rest of this year, after which it will reconsider. Many decisions still have to be made. But in the end, beefing up and getting out may be the same thing–and the only option that will work.
