Last October we learned that once again American intelligence caught the North cheating–the goal this time was not plutonium but highly enriched uranium. As before, the inspectors were thrown out, the North said it was pulling out of the NPT, and it has again resorted to saber rattling.
The similarities between the two nuclear confrontations are striking–but so are the strategic differences. First, this time North Korea admits it has a secret uranium-enrichment program, and claims it already has some nuclear weapons. Second, over the last 10 years Pyongyang has deployed medium-range missiles that can reach Japan, and is closer to producing longer-range missiles that would reach the United States. Third, many in South Korea now believe the United States is as responsible for the standoff as the North. And finally, among the North’s newest threats was reportedly the suggestion that it might consider selling nuclear weapons to the highest bidder.
What should Washington do this time? Sanctions are always appealing when dealing with rogue nations because they do not require talks, they involve direct action without the risks of military action and they can have broad multilateral appeal. Unfortunately, sanctions will not force Pyongyang to give up its nukes because China will not allow the North to be driven to the brink of collapse.
The only option more attractive than sanctions is one or another version of a “free lunch,” where the United States does nothing, but the problem goes away. The first version–let the Chinese solve it–would have Beijing exert its influence on Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons in order to avoid having the United States use military force on China’s doorstep, or worse, to avoid seeing Japan acquire nuclear weapons to deter a nuclear North. The second version would build upon our victory in Iraq, and a not-so-implicit threat of regime change, to force the North Koreans to back down. The problem with these options is that China is not likely to encourage North Korea’s collapse, and Iraq, ironically, may be heating up the North’s nuclear program, not chilling it. Both are prescriptions for slow-motion failure, and time is not on our side.
There is, then, the military option. It could be an air strike against the nuclear facilities we can locate, or an invasion to remove Kim Jong Il, as some in the Bush administration favor. The problem with the military option is that estimates of American and Korean casualties in a war on the peninsula run from the tens of thousands to the hundreds of thousands or more. It would not be another gulf war; it would be another Korean War. And this time the South Koreans might well not be with us, though they certainly would suffer horrendous loss of life as if they were. This option cannot be ruled out, but we should have no illusions about the costs.
This brings us back to negotiation. The problems here are that there are deep divisions within the Bush administration, much of which characterizes any engagement with the North as a reward for bad behavior. Worse, the president seems to accept the view that we can embrace diplomacy while flatly rejecting negotiation. The fact is that negotiation usually means that both sides give something to get more. The real test is whether a deal that benefits us can be achieved. The Agreed Framework did not solve the North Korean nuclear problem permanently, but we are better off for having made the deal. Could we do better this time, making it harder for them to cheat again? Of course. Is the North’s opening position, as reported, unreasonable? Absolutely. This is how we began talks a decade ago: they want something and they are prepared to negotiate; we want something and we should be prepared to negotiate to determine whether we can reach an agreement that advances our national interest.
