Still, peace negotiators in Geneva were claiming a victory of sorts. After recognizing that they couldn’t count on NATO airstrikes, the Muslims returned to the talks, hoping for a better deal on paper. The international mediators themselves appeared to be sick of dealing with an intractable war and were now impatiently trying to impose peace. They presented the Serbs, Croats and Muslims with a 10-day deadline to approve a redrawn map of Bosnia-or face war without end. The leaders of all three sides did agree tentatively to a U.N. trusteeship of Sarajevo for two years. But that breakthrough raised troubling questions about what role the West might have to play in Bosnia after the war. “It would be good if the United Nations controlled Sarajevo,” said a Bosnian soldier. “But I don’t think the fighting will stop.”

In Sarajevo alone, snuffing out the conflict would require an additional 6,000 U.N. troops, or a total of 15,000, say Western diplomats. Even then, a viable U.N. protectorate would have to rely on the good will of the combatants. And how much good will can there be, after 17 months of intense fighting? Policing the capital would be a long and messy affair. “Historically, the U.N. has been excellent at freezing the situation on the ground but not good at restoring the previous situation,” says Jonathan Eyal, a military analyst at the London think tank, Royal United Services Institute. Peacekeeping might begin with disarming tens of thousands of Serbs and Muslims in Sarajevo and the erection of barricades between neighborhoods. Street fighting could well continue for years. “It’s not possible to live together,” insists “Milan,” deputy commander of the local Serbian army detachment in Grbavica, in Sarajevo’s eastern suburbs. “Maybe something will be possible after 5, 10, 15, 20 years. But now,” he says, “there has to be a divided city.”

Meanwhile, enforcing a peace throughout Bosnia would require at least 40,000 troops, says U.N. mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg. And just where would they come from? “It’s no secret that the United States wants to make good on its promise” to send peacekeepers, says Stoltenberg. But U.S. officials made that promise last February for a peace plan that died in May, and there’s no sign they’re still planning to keep it. “We’re entering terra incognita,” admits a senior Clinton administration official. just last week the White House broke a 50-year policy and agreed to consider placing U.S. troops under foreign commanders, presumably as part of U.N. efforts. But it’s not clear whether the policy applies to peacekeeping in Bosnia. And if the United Nations won’t take charge of the truce in Bosnia, it’s not clear who will. “Most people are waiting to see if it’s an honorable or dishonorable peace,” says a NATO official. Britain, which already has 2,400 troops in Bosnia, refuses to send more men. So does France–unless Washington matches Paris’s current contribution of 6,000 peacekeepers. “France cannot be in the position of financing peace in former Yugoslavia by itself,” sniffs a French government official.

Such reluctance is more than a craven game of after-you-Alphonse. Western governments, strapped by their own sluggish economies, aren’t in a generous mood. Policing the partition plan would far exceed the current annual U.N. peacekeeping budget of $3 billion. “And worse yet,” says a NATO source, “the expenses would go on and on and on.” It will take many billions of dollars to rebuild Bosnia–beginning with basic utilities, roads and houses and continuing with schools, factories, churches and mosques.

No one likes to admit that the major legacy of the war is the creation of what amounts to an international welfare state. Already, nearly 2 million Bosnians rely on U.N. assistance to get by. Thousands more become dependent on a handout everyday, thanks to Serbian and Croatian roadblocks that choke off indigenous commerce as well as humanitarian aid. A harsh winter, coming as early as mid-October, will challenge an already overextended U.N. relief system. But the most severe hidden costs may come from a partition plan. Each new section of Bosnia will want to clear out enemy minorities. “A new wave of ’ethnic cleansing’ will occur,” predicts Mohammed Filipovic, a member of the Bosnian team in Geneva. The transfer of populations could result in as many as 1 million new refugees, reckons a U.N. official. The war in Bosnia has often seemed interminable. But just wait until you see the peace.