Consider the magnitude of recent policy reversals:
The administration had stubbornly insisted that no more troops were needed in Iraq. But today, there are 20,000 additional soldiers in the country.
From the start it refused to give the U.N. any political role in Iraq. Now the U.N. is an indispensable partner, both in the June 30 transition and in preparing for elections.
Radical “de-Baathification,” the pet project of the Pentagon and Ahmad Chalabi, has been overturned. The Army that was disbanded is being slowly re-created.
Heavy-handed military tactics have given way to a more careful political-military strategy in Fallujah, Karbala and Najaf that emphasizes a role for local leaders.
Imagine what Iraq might have looked like if these policies had been put in place 14 months ago.
Iraq policy has been wrested from the Pentagon and is now being directed by Robert Blackwill, a diplomat on the National Security Council. Blackwill is a smart, aggressive, effective problem-solver who has little time for ideology or ideologues. Since he had no previous history or baggage on Iraq, he has been able to focus on getting it right rather than proving that his original theories were right.
But old mistakes still infect Iraq policy. Many of the problems that have plagued Iraq have been the result of the machinations surrounding Iraq’s Governing Council, which commands almost no respect among the Iraqi people. That was why Washington realized last November that it needed a new set of players. The United Nations was invited to pick this new “interim government” so that it was not seen as a U.S. puppet. So who ended up announcing the new interim prime minister last Friday? The Governing Council. And who’s in the interim government? Council member Ayad Allawi as prime minister, and (in all likelihood) Council members Adnan Pachachi as president, and Ibrahim Jafari and Jalal Talabani as vice presidents. Two of the four are exiles whom the United States has supported. Most of them are intelligent, decent and politically astute. Allawi waged an impressive campaign, garnering support from several quarters. But to get backing from the Governing Council is one thing; getting it from the Iraqi people is another.
What’s done is done. The two keys going forward are (1) to give this government internal credibility and (2) to internationalize dramatically the external assistance to Iraq. First, it’s crucial that the rest of the group not be retreads from the Governing Council. Then, the new government will need the endorsement of various leaders within Iraq, most importantly the senior clerics in Najaf. The U.N.’s representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, has been in constant touch with Ayatollah Ali Sistani. The latter should be given whatever concessions are necessary so that he will recognize this government.
The new government will need to establish its credibility, which means its power vis-a-vis the United States. Washington is currently engaged in a foolish debate over whether the new government should have authority over American troops in Iraq. Without giving it formal military authority, there has to be some way to make clear that it will have authority to approve or reject offensive military operations. It will likely have that veto anyway. American soldiers will not be able to launch a Fallujah-like attack in the future if the sovereign government of Iraq condemns it. That’s political reality. Why not give it in theory what it will have in fact?
The other source of legitimacy the government will need is international. There will almost certainly be a U.N. resolution on Iraq in the next few weeks. But what is needed is a strong resolution, endorsing the new government and inviting countries to help it in all possible ways. So far, Washington has been unable to get much by way of troop commitments. It has asked 12 countries for help, and only two have responded positively. Countries will be more likely to help if the United Nations is given greater control and authority going forward.
Over the past few weeks we have seen a number of despondent editorials by former supporters of the war. They despair that Ahmad Chalabi will not be handed the keys to the country, that we are not crushing the insurgency with massive force, that we are sharing power with the United Nations, that Brahimi has been given so much power. This is a good omen. It means the grown-ups have taken control. It might not solve the many problems in Iraq. But it does mark the return of sanity to America’s Iraq policy.
